R educing global catastrophic risks (GCRs) is one of our top priorities at the Open Philanthropy Project. * We have a particular interest in addressing GCRs from biological sources-or global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs), to use the term coined by the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. As we build our new biosecurity and pandemic preparedness (BPP) program, we're putting a lot of thought into our definition of GCBRs and how to make high-impact investments that reduce these risks. We are delighted that the Center for Health Security has initiated this discussion, and we're pleased to have the opportunity to share our thoughts on the topic.
In establishing GCRs as one of our program areas and biosecurity and pandemic preparedness as one of our specific focuses, the Open Philanthropy Project systematically assessed a wide range of potential GCR sources-including climate change, nuclear weapons, artificial intelligence, asteroids, and volcanos. 1 We came to the conclusion that pandemics are among the most important, tractable, and neglected potential causes of such a catastrophic event.
{ By our working definition, a GCR is something that could permanently alter the trajectory of human civilization in a way that would undermine its long-term potential or, in the most extreme case, threaten its survival. This prompts the question: How severe would a pandemic need to be to create such a catastrophic outcome? Some of my colleagues have suggested that an event on the order of at least 100 million fatalities, and probably much higher, would be necessary. This argument is informed in part by the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which caused an estimated 50-100 million fatalities. While it had a devastating impact in terms of loss of life, the pandemic did not appear to alter the longterm trajectory of human civilization. This suggests that a more severe pandemic may be necessary to destabilize civilization over longer time scales. 2 However, these types of estimates are highly uncertain, and they raise challenging questions about the relationship between fatality levels and the resulting second-, third-and higher-order effects that could undermine systems that are necessary to support civilization. For example, we think it is likely that once fatalities got to a certain level, we could expect to see a variety of knock-on effects, including collapsing financial systems, collapsing healthcare systems, disrupted global supply chains, food and water shortages, power disruptions, or military conflict. How would these cascading system failures play out, and how would they influence the severity of pandemic outcomes? In addition to these considerations, as the Center for Health Security essay astutely points out, a high-fatality event may not be necessary to cause a GCBR. Alternative pathways, such as an organism or molecule that causes widespread negative effects on fertility, could also plausibly lead to such an outcome.
Another important open question is: What is the most likely source of a GCBR? Our intuition is that, in the longer term, engineered pathogens-dispersed through a deliberate attack or accidental release-pose the greatest potential risk for this type of event. However, we don't have enough evidence to dismiss the possibility of a GCBR from a natural outbreak. If we saw convincing evidence that countered our intuition, it could lead us to change our working assumptions on this point. Yet another challenge in our work is the lack of consensus about the potential severity and magnitude of biological risks and the lack of discourse about GCBRs in the biosecurity and pandemic preparedness community. GCBRs are generally viewed as very low probability events, or altogether implausible, and therefore do not make it onto the list of government priorities that warrant a share of finite time and resources-especially when decision makers are faced with more pressing global public health crises. (In this vein, the Center's proposal to think of GCBRs as a separate category of risk, warranting its own funds as opposed to competing with other global public health priorities, makes a lot of sense.)
In fact, our impression is that it is rare to find academic publications that discuss pandemics with the potential to cause more than 1 million fatalities. And our sense from conversations with experts in the field is that the consensus about the plausible severity of a pandemic falls apart when considering events on the order of tens of millions of fatalities. Bill Gates's recent statement at the Munich Security Conference about the potential for a pandemic to cause tens of millions of fatalities grabbed many headlines. Gates is clearly a high-profile figure, but the severity and magnitude of events he warned of were arguably part of the reason his statement garnered so much attention.
While events on this scale have happened in the pastfor example, during the 1918 Spanish flu pandemicsignificantly larger and unprecedented events can be difficult to imagine. In light of the disparate views on the plausibility of a GCR-level biological event, we think there is value in engaging the broader community in dialogue about the upper bounds of plausible worst case scenarios and the practical steps that we can take to reduce those risks.
As a funder in this space, Open Philanthropy has a keen interest in finding the most effective and practical ways to mitigate GCBRs. Part of this effort will likely involve work that applies across the risk spectrum. This is because many of the systems needed to prevent GCR-level events are the same pandemic preparedness assets that are necessary for containing smaller scale events.
However, because we think that novel pathogensespecially those that could be engineered in the coming decades-pose a particularly acute global catastrophic risk, we are very interested in tools and systems that are most useful for mitigating those specific risks. In our view, areas of particular GCBR relevance include diagnostic tools based on DNA sequencing technologies, which can rapidly detect new pathogens; broad spectrum antivirals; and systems for rapid development, testing, and distribution of novel medical countermeasures. We are also interested in biosecurity measures that reduce the risk that biotechnology advances will be exploited to develop novel biological weapons.
As we continue to develop our work on GCBRs, we welcome the contributions of our colleagues in the broader community-both to clarify our shared understanding of these risks and to identify practical, concrete steps for risk reduction.
